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Cavell on American Philosophy
and the Idea of America
RICHARD ELDRIDGE

Here is a common picture of what American philosophy looks like to and
within many American philosophy departments.1 To a considerable degree,
it does not exist at all. Most departments do not feel obliged to teach
American philosophy as they do modern philosophy (Descartes to Kant)
and ancient Greek philosophy. It is normally not part of the requirements
for a major. Of course, writings by Americans are mostly what do get taught,
but they are taught as just philosophy, not as American philosophy. When
it is taught, it is taught as a peripheral history course, typically focusing on
the major pragmatist thinkers from the late nineteenth to the mid twentieth
century: Peirce, James, and Dewey, with perhaps a turn toward Rorty to
round things off. These ﬁgures are thought to emphasize the importance
of paying attention to what works: to experimental science in the pursuit of
knowledge and to liberal reform in politics. The only way to discern what
works – in either epistemology or politics – is through trial and error. Epistemology and social theory in any more visionary sense are evaded.2 Our
going practices of experimental science, particularly natural science, have
shown themselves to be good enough: neither in need of nor admitting of
any further epistemic support from foundationalist theories of justiﬁcation.
In politics, liberal decency, respect for rights, and reliance on markets are
about the best we can do. Larger visions of social justice are by and large
fantastic and potentially tyrannical, compared to a clear-eyed understanding of how decent people mostly can and do get on socially in order to
satisfy their preferences. To the extent that the pragmatist commitment to
getting on with what works is taken seriously, it is not so much understood
as itself a visionary discovery of the natures of knowledge and justice as it is
just taken for granted. Strong voluntarist pictures of human responsibility
as including the possibility of getting right what we really ought to do in
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either the pursuit of knowledge or the arrangement of social life are simply
dropped.3 The naturalist stances of Quine, Rorty, and Dennett, according
to which there’s little point in making much of a fuss about free will (in
anything other than the Humean sense of political liberty or hypothetical
freedom) come to the fore. The key notion is coping, and emphatically not
achieving our human destiny.
This picture of American philosophy in turn both rests on and further articulates larger images of America and of philosophy. America is
understood as the place in which freedom is construed as a matter centrally, perhaps exclusively, of individual liberty (as opposed to the achievement of the power to do or be something in particular – for example,
to be more fully human or properly faithful). Most Americans exercise
their liberty by pursuing happiness and satisfaction in the private spheres
of family life, consumption, and enjoyment. Larger workplace and public
identities are taken to be instrumental to satisfactions in these more private spheres, unless, of course, some people just happen to enjoy political
work or quasi-familial workplace friendships or workplace activities. The
business of politics in America is the fair reconciliation of competitive individual and factional interests. There are not enough goods to go around
to enable everyone to satisfy every preference. Government hence properly sets up rules of fair competition, including centrally the laws of property and person and the laws of contract, fair trade, workplace safety, and
nonexploitativeness.
Philosophy is understood in relation to this picture of America as committed to the overcoming of merely personal interest. People do have idiosyncratic interests. Some people devote themselves to ﬂy-ﬁshing; others to cello
playing; others to cooking; still others to building bridges. Some people
are Methodists; others are Catholics, Jews, Episcopalians, and nonbelievers. But no set of commitments, practical or religious, works for everyone.
Older, premodern philosophies were quasi-theologies that attempted to install a favored set of practical or religious commitments as mandatory. They
were failed efforts to make a particular form of devotion rationally obligatory. Happily, we are, in philosophy, beyond that project and its potential
and actual tyrannies. Whether as the analysis of concepts, as a defense of
the achievements of science (in yielding understandings that anyone might
make use of or not, as anyone wishes), or as an outline of fair terms of justice
and the rule of law that favors no one set of personal interests, philosophy
is, above all, neutral.4
There is a great deal of both truth and value in these pictures of America
and of philosophy. It is, nonetheless, Stanley Cavell’s perception that to
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the extent that these pictures are true, they are made true by Americans
and philosophers adopting them out of conformism, acquiescence, desperation, and complicity in failures to achieve our best possibilities – as
philosophers, as Americans, and as human persons. All too often, Cavell
proposes (following Emerson), we fail to dare to exist,5 fail both personally and socially to live in pursuit and achievement of genuine care and
commitment.
According to Cavell, philosophy and politics and America all promise
more than this. To the pursuit of happiness as the satisfaction of individual
preferences, Cavell – following Emerson and Thoreau, in company with
Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Plato, and Rousseau – poses a counterimage of
happiness as conversion to and achievement of freedom, understood not as
liberty, but rather as something more like full mastery in what one does
and says.6 What is needed, then, in this view is a kind of rebirth: away
from instrumentalism and into accession to transﬁgured commitment and
expressive power. It is naturally difﬁcult to describe the kind of transformation that is in question. It is something like the discovery on the part of
the modernist artist in the course of work that her natural talent and instincts can be originally enacted in an intelligible way: to make new sense,7
against the grain of the old. The thought is that as it stands “we are not
free, not whole, and not new, and we know this and are on a downward
path of despair because of it; and that . . . for a grownup to grow he requires
strangeness and transformation, i.e., birth.”8 The hope is that “we might
despair of despair itself, rather than of life, and cast that off, and begin, and
so reverse our direction.”9
The idea, by contrast, that philosophy should be neutral and should
focus on what works – more or less well and from our present vantage
point – is then a betrayal of what philosophy has centrally been and still
centrally can be. “Philosophy begins with, say, in the Socratic ambition, and
may at any time encounter, an aspiration toward the therapeutic, a sense of
itself as guiding the soul, or self, from self-imprisonment toward the light
or the instinct of freedom.”10
The catch, however, is that there are no standing terms available for
specifying fully the condition at which transformation or conversion or rebirth aim. A sense of this catch is especially prominent in America, with
its founding resistance to any single national religion. This sense also ﬁgures in the resistance of certain philosophers, typically the ones Cavell
cites as heroes and forebears – Emerson, Thoreau, Rousseau, Plato, and
Wittgenstein, most prominently – to academicism and to conclusive formulations of stance, that is, in the drift of these writers toward a certain
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literariness or poetry. For them the process of discovery of the self to itself
takes place in and through an ongoing course of writing. As part of the
founding myth of perfectionism, as it is exempliﬁed in Plato’s Republic and
then further inhabited by Emerson, Thoreau, and Wittgenstein, Cavell
lists the sense that “the self ﬁnds that it can turn (convert, revolutionize
itself ) . . . [in order to achieve] a further state of that self, where the higher
is determined not by natural talent [that is, not by birth] but by seeking
to know what you are made of and cultivating the thing you are meant
to do.”11 As it engages in this seeking, the self ﬁnds itself caught up in
the movement or work of thought and of writing, resistant to what Cavell
stigmatizes as “moralism” and dogma and the academic. As vehicle of this
seeking, “philosophical writing . . . enters into competition with the ﬁeld
of poetry, . . . not to banish all poetry from the just city but to claim for
itself the privilege of the work poetry does in making things happen to
the soul, so far as that work has its rights.”12 This kind of philosophical
writing – both modeled on and in competition with poetry, rather than
the treatise or scientiﬁc report – expresses both an ambition for conversion in and through process and a distinctly American sense of striking
out for the new, of being on the way. Philosophy, from Plato through
Emerson through Wittgenstein, then is about happiness, but where “the
achievement of happiness requires not the perennial and fuller satisfaction of our needs as they stand but the examination and transformation of
those needs.”13 What is sought, through transformation, is not the achievement of a ﬁnal state, but rather “a sort of continuous reafﬁrmation”14 of
self in activity and in relationship. To seek such a continuous reafﬁrmation, and to see philosophy as seeking it, out of what is perceived as a
present state of acquiescence, conformity, complicity, and lack of interest is not neutrally to endorse moderately successful strategies of coping
that are already in place. One might say that the perfectionist strain in the
thought of Emerson and Thoreau points us toward the possibility and value
of falling in love and living in love with what we do, against our present
half-heartedness.
Politics, too, then is different, for political thinking and political activity
are open to being informed by perfectionist aspirations. “The transformation of the self . . . ﬁnds expression in the imagination of a transformation of
society . . . , where what is best for society is modeled on what is best for the
individual soul.”15 At the beginning of an important essay relatively early
in his turn toward Emerson, Cavell cites “the following pair of sentences,
attributed . . . to William James” that are set in brass in the lobby of William
James Hall at Harvard.
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THE COMMUNITY STAGNATES WITHOUT THE IMPULSE
OF THE INDIVIDUAL
THE IMPULSE DIES AWAY WITHOUT THE SYMPATHY
OF THE COMMUNITY16

This message, which, Cavell remarks, “may be taken [among other ways] as
claiming a transcendental relation among the concepts of community and
individual as they have so far shown themselves,”17 is what politics as the
usual business of factional negotiation tends to forget or repress.
An image and practice of politics that embraces this message incorporates, as politics as usual does not, a role for what Cavell, following Kant,
calls reﬂective judgment: “the expression of a conviction whose grounding
remains subjective – say myself – but which expects or claims justiﬁcation
from the (universal) concurrence of other subjectivities, on reﬂection.”18 It
is this kind of reﬂective judgment that might best record a perception of
our present liabilities and call us to something better – for example, away
from present practices of “intolerable inequality or discrimination.”19 The
making of reﬂective judgments and the practice of reﬂection on them by
others point toward politics not as negotiation, but as conversation, a joint
exploration of joint possibilities.
The aim of such political conversation is not the satisfaction of individual interests or preferences as they stand, but rather the joining together of
the private-erotic with the public-political. This is a tall order; the private
and the political do not readily come together. But “while it is the nature
of the erotic to form a stumbling block to a reasonable, civilized existence,
call it the political, human happiness nevertheless goes on demanding satisfaction in both realms.”20 What we ﬁnd ourselves engaged in, with one
another politically and not just one by one, alone, is “a struggle for mutual
freedom.”21
One immediate consequence of this aim and of our standing failure quite
wholly to achieve it is that our sense of being members of our society and
culture is likely to take the form of a sense of compromise by and complicity
with society as it stands. The social contract as Rousseau and Kant imagine
it, as theorists of autonomy (not of preference satisfaction), and as it is lived
in America is a matter of consent, where “my consent is not . . . modiﬁable
or proportionable (psychological exile is not exile): I cannot keep consent
focused on the successes or graces of society; it reaches into every corner
of society’s failure or ugliness. . . . A compromised state of society, since it is
mine, compromises me.”22 This experience of compromise and complicity
in American society and culture is all too familiar to Americans – aware of
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the depth both of their Americanness and of the failures of their society and
culture to achieve their promises.
Rightly developed – as Rousseau and Kant (rather than Hobbes, say)
develop it – social contract theory focuses this sense of joint membership
and complicity. To consent to the social contract is then not to take up
an instrument for the pursuit of personal advantage; it is to accept one’s
responsibility for society and its promise of freedom. Consent implies
that I recognize the society and its government, so constituted, as mine;
which means that I am answerable not merely to it, but for it. So far, then,
as I recognize myself to be exercising my responsibility for it, my obedience
to it is obedience to my own laws; citizenship in that case is the same as
my autonomy; the polis is the ﬁeld within which I work out my personal
identity and it is the creation of (political) freedom.23

As Stephen Mulhall usefully puts it, Cavell’s thought is that the story of
a social contract makes explicit the idea that “citizenship is [and is to be]
not a constraint on my autonomy but an aspect of it.”24 Society is, in the
Rousseauian-Kantian form of social contract theory, “an artifact” to which
I am “deeply . . . joined,”25 both bound up in its promises and complicit in
its failures.
The essential message of the idea of a social contract is that political institutions require justiﬁcation, that they are absolutely without sanctity, that
power over us is held on trust from us, that institutions have no authority
other than the authority we lend them, that we are their architects, that
they are therefore artifacts, that there are laws or ends, of nature or justice,
in terms of which they are to be tested. They are experiments.26

The image of America that Cavell forwards is then that it is a place
of these experiments, perhaps the central place. “It had a mythical beginning, still visible, if ambiguous, to itself, and to its audience.”27 Out of this
beginning there arose “a society whose idea of itself requires that it repudiate the hierarchies and enforcements of the European past and make
a new beginning.”28 Unlike the countries of Europe, America has been
from the beginning and remains the nation of no settled tribe or Stamm,
of no national religion, not even of any national language. It is a place of
immigrancy, a place to come to, in order then to strike off in one’s own
direction.
No doubt this is a kind of myth. The settlement and cultivation of
America are in historical fact shot through with violence. There were
Native Americans here before there were Europeans, and the Europeans
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introduced the overwhelming disﬁguration of slavery. As Cavell himself
remarks,
It is simply crazy that there should ever have come into being a world
with such a sin in it, in which a man is set apart because of his color – the
superﬁcial fact about a human being. Who could want such a world? For
an American, ﬁghting for his love of country, that the last hope of earth
should from its beginning have swallowed slavery, is an irony so withering,
a justice so intimate in its rebuke of pride, as to measure only with God.29

Yet despite this withering irony, in the very face of it, this founding
mythology – this mythology of a founding, a new beginning – is nonetheless lived imaginatively in America, when Americans dare to dream. It is
a central part of “the inner agenda of [our] culture”30 that America is the
place where freedom is to be achieved.
Everywhere intertwined with and enacted in these counterimages of
philosophy (as transformative thinking, talking, and writing), of politics (as
the conversation and cultivation of freedom), and of America (as the new
place for the achievement of freedom – its birthplace) is an image of the
human person, ﬁt to live in these practices and in this place. The self is not
a thing that is simply given, but a power of becoming responsible for and
fully invested in what one does, which power is emergent, paradoxically,
through its own activity.
The fate of having a self – of being human – is one in which the self is
always to be found; fated to be sought, or not; recognized, or not. My self is
something, apparently, toward which I can stand in various relations, ones
in which I can stand to other selves, named by the same terms, e.g., love,
hate, disgust, acceptance, knowledge, ignorance, faith, pride, shame.31

If we do not achieve full investment or what Emerson calls Power or SelfReliance, but instead accept complicity, conformity, desperation, and dullness, then we fail to (dare to) exist. We face, or in conformity evade,
the issue . . . of the self as a thing of cares and commitments, one which to
exist has to ﬁnd itself, which underlies the myth of the self as on a journey (a
path in Plato’s image, a stairway in Emerson’s, a ladder in others’), a journey
to, let us say, the truth of itself (not exhausted by its goods and its rights).32

The ideas, ﬁrst, that we exist in and through our cares and commitments
and, second, that we are able to be variously ashamed or proud of them, or
faithful in them, or disgusted by them are inﬂections of the Kantian idea
that our consciousness is apperceptively structured. “The I think,” Kant
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reminds us, “must be able to accompany all my representations; for otherwise
something would be represented in me that could not be thought at all,
which is as much to say that the representation would either be impossible
or else at least would be nothing for me.”33 That is, for any judgment that
I make, it is possible for me in reﬂection to become aware that it is I who
have thus judged. The capacity to do this is impersonal, not unique to any
individual. It is possessed by all beings who are capable of judgment. That
our consciousness has this structure further implies, according to Kant, that
we are responsible for our judgments and the actions that ﬂow from them.
“The human being, who is otherwise acquainted with the whole of nature
solely through sense, knows himself also through pure apperception,” so
that he is aware of himself as possessing “reason, [which] has causality,”34
that is, which can give birth to actions, for which we are responsible. When
we act out of respect for the moral law, then we exercise our practical reason
and power of action appropriately, thereby coming into our own as human
agents.
Thoreau picks up this Kantian line of thought, according to Cavell,
when he writes, in the “Solitude” section of Walden:
With thinking we may be beside ourselves in a sane sense. By a conscious
effort of the mind we can stand aloof from actions and their consequences.
. . . We are not wholly involved in Nature. . . . I only know myself as a human
entity; the scene, so to speak, of thoughts and affections; and am sensible
of a certain doubleness by which I can stand as remote from myself as from
another. However intense my experience, I am conscious of the presence
and criticism of a part of me, which, as it were, is not a part of me, but a
spectator, sharing no experience, but taking note of it, and that is no more
I than it is you.35

We have, then, an impersonal capacity for reﬂecting on our judgments, and
hence for evaluating what we do – for being proud or ashamed or embarrassed or (culpably) ignorant or accepting of it. Hence we should (dare to)
seek to be proud, upright, and fully committed in relation to what we venture
(never knowing whether the world will cooperate with us or not), rather
than timid, acquiescent, or ashamed. Thoroughgoing commitment in and
to what one does lures us, or should lure us, as we seek to wed uncertain
venture to reﬂective endorsement. Or, as Cavell furthers Thoreau’s thought,
Our ﬁrst resolve should be toward the nextness of the self to the self; it is
the capacity not to deny either of its positions or attitudes – that it is the
watchman or guardian of itself, and hence demands of itself transparence,
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settling, clearing, constancy; and that it is the workman, whose eye cannot
see to the end of its labors, but whose answerability is endless for the constructions in which it houses itself. The answerability of the self to itself is
its possibility of awakening.36

Emerson’s sense of the human person is similar, as in “Self-Reliance” he
develops Descartes’ cogito into the thought that, as Cavell has it, “if I am to
exist I must name my existence, acknowledge it. This imperative entails that
I am a thing with two foci, or, in Emerson’s image, two magnetic poles –
say a positive and a negative, or an active and a passive.”37 That the self
in its doubleness or nextness has active and passive sides that might be put
together, that it might thus answer to itself in and through its courses of
action, is our inﬁnite task and possibility.
Thoreau and Emerson are, for Cavell, the American philosophers who
(along with Wittgenstein elsewhere) take up the Kantian image of the human person. In doing so in their speciﬁc way, they point us toward the
romance of expressive freedom, the romance of the pursuit of full existence, uprightness, pride, self-reliance, and answerability to self. Not that
this romance is concluded or even quite concludable: far from it. Thoreau
and Emerson are “philosophers of direction, orientation, tirelessly prompting us to be on our way, endlessly asking us where we stand, what it is we
face.”38 “Emerson’s writing is meant as the provision of experience for these
shores, of our trials, perils, essays,”39 where this experience is not already in
place to be smoothly developed into happiness, but instead takes the form
of trials, perils, and essays, from and through which conversion of care and
commitment are required.
That Thoreau and Emerson seek new direction – a conversion of, and
from within, experience as it stands, in which they are themselves all too
caught up – lends to their writing (and to Cavell’s) qualities of aversiveness to
the ordinary transmission of a settled message: a certain sense of tentativeness and self-revision, a foregrounding of the writer’s own starts and turns
and halts. Their writing enacts a sense of seeking to be on the way out of
present straits and toward happiness, freedom, and self-reliance. As things
stand, our getting on the way is enabled, but also inhibited, by imperfect
present conditions. Hence for these writers it is a matter (as it typically is
for modernist artists) of getting started at all, of ﬁguring out how to “take
an interest in our lives”40 from within present dullness, conformity, and
acquiescence.
Thoreau calls this everyday condition quiet desperation; Emerson says
silent melancholy; Coleridge and Wordsworth are apt to say despondency
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or dejection; Heidegger speaks of it as our bedimmed averageness;
Wittgenstein as our bewitchment; Austin both as a drunken profundity
(which he knew more about than he cared to let on) and as a lack of seriousness. To ﬁnd what degrees of freedom we have in this condition, to show
that it is at once needless yet somehow, because of that, all but necessary,
inescapable, to subject its presentation of necessity to diagnosis, in order to
ﬁnd truer necessities, is the romantic quest I am happy to join.41

Getting on our way from where we are requires, in the perception of
Emerson, Thoreau, and Cavell, not escape (from the cave) into the abstract,
or into scientiﬁc procedures, but engagement with the near, the low, the
common, the ordinary. Emerson and Thoreau work “out of the problematic
of the day, the everyday, the near, the low, the common, in conjunction with
what they call speaking of necessaries, and speaking with necessity.”42 They
write out of “devotion to the thing they call the common, the familiar, the
near, the low.”43 In doing so, the hope – their hope – is that we might
hear “how the language we traverse every day can contain undiscovered
treasure”44 that we can work into our lives because it is already worked into
our lives (albeit in ways we do not hear), unlike the false promises of ascent
of more traditional doctrines.
Out of our present condition, Emerson and Thoreau (and Cavell) propose to teach or provoke us by stumbling ahead of us toward the light
of freedom. They are not experts, either in the instruments or means for
the satisfaction of desires as they stand or in the speciﬁcs of the end to be
achieved. There is “no expert knowledge” on offer, “nothing closed to the
ordinary human being, once, that is to say, that being lets himself or herself
be informed by the process and ambition of philosophy.”45 What we might
best do “may not be measurable from outside,”46 but only from within the
ordinary, the cave, America. We are to be, somehow, “guided by our experience but not dictated to by it,”47 as we seek to put the active (workman) and
passive (watchman) sides of the self together and seek to compose selves together into a perfected conversational culture of freedom – all from where
we are.
There are, then, no formulae for the achievement of freedom. Advice
about means and instruments does not heighten or deepen commitment.
Descriptions of ultimate goods to be achieved are tendentious and insupportable, in coming from ‘outside’ where we are. Because there are no formulae, there are no experts in freedom. Though freedom remains, in this
perception, central to the inner agenda of our selves and culture, Americans
are also skeptical about prophets. They value expertise and sound advice

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Swarthmore College Library, on 28 Feb 2018 at 18:56:39, subject to the Cambridge
Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge
University Press, 2010
Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms.
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511613944.008

182

RICHARD ELDRIDGE

about coping and getting on with the business at hand. If Thoreau and
Emerson and Cavell do not offer that, but instead themselves only stumble
as writers toward freedom, then Americans are all too likely to scorn them
or, if touched by them at all, to be unsettled but unconvinced. This is pretty
much Cavell’s sense of the place of Thoreau and Emerson in American
culture. Cavell notes what he calls “the extraordinary fact that those I regard as the founders of American thinking – Ralph Waldo Emerson and
Henry David Thoreau – are philosophically repressed in the culture they
founded.”48 Given the pragmatist strain in American culture, in competition with its inner agendas of freedom and perfection, this fact is perhaps
not so extraordinary after all. Americans are generally not terribly attentive
to their history, especially to their philosophical history. When they do pay
attention to it, they are, as pragmatic individualists, perhaps reasonably inclined to pay attention to Jefferson, Madison (especially Federalist No. 10
on faction and the separation of powers), and Lincoln. These thinkers offer political solutions – deep and abstract, but still political – to political
problems, not conversion.49
Cavell, however, nonetheless argues that Emerson and Thoreau are
speciﬁcally repressed. “I am taking precisely that condition to signify their
pertinence to the present: I do not, the culture does not, repress the thought
of Schopenhauer or Kierkegaard or Spengler; they were simply not part
of our formation.”50 Emerson and Thoreau are “threats, or say embarrassments, to what we have learned to call philosophy”51 and to what in our
acquiescence we have come to think of as America. This is because the inner
agenda of freedom that they forward, and as they forward it in their speciﬁc
ways (out of allegiance to America, to its future, and to philosophy’s) is itself
in speciﬁc competition with America’s pragmatist, competitive individualist, “get on with business” strands of life. They offer “a continuous rebuke
to the way we live”52 from within the contested insides of the way we live
(and of themselves).
Cavell’s talk of rebuke, prophecy, and conversion to freedom is likely,
however, to seem itself empty, tendentious, and “cracker-barrel,” especially
to Americans naturally suspicious of settled terms of religious and cultural
achievement. Such talk seems to monger shame and to do so without telling
us much about what, speciﬁcally, to do. Emerson and Thoreau seem to undo
our sense of ourselves as innocent, without outlining any particular route
of recovery or restoration, hence to cast our lives as tragic. Their writings
can feel like jeremiads. No doubt we should regret American slavery, and
no doubt we face many problems of persistent unfairness and lack of opportunity that should be addressed through political means. But should we
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feel shame toward our past and our selves, and is conversion the most apt
response to the problems we face?53
In light, therefore, of this worry about emptiness and shame mongering,
it is especially worth noting that in his own faithfulness to the near, the low,
and the common Cavell himself traces the achievement of a genuinely honorable American romantic happiness and freedom. In Pursuits of Happiness –
his happiest book – Cavell follows the careers of the principal pairs in six
American movies made between 1934 and 1949. His thought here is that
the principal characters in these movies – Jean (Barbara Stanwyck) and
Charles (Henry Fonda), Peter (Clark Gable) and Ellie (Claudette Colbert),
David (Cary Grant) and Susan (Katherine Hepburn), and so on – “take the
time, and take the pains, to converse intelligently and playfully about themselves and about one another.”54 Among the questions that they ask themselves and each other – most explicitly in the case of David in Bringing Up
Baby, but implicitly throughout – is “What am I doing here, that is, how
have I got into this relation and why do I stay in it?”55 Cavell emphasizes
continuously that the asking and answering of this question are ﬁgures for
consent to the social contract, that the achievement of settlement in the
relationship of marriage is a ﬁgure for settlement of and with one’s country
and culture and self (and vice versa). As though, then, to make the rebukes
and promises of America’s prophets other than empty and tendentious,
these pairs do achieve a settlement. Among other things, they discover –
on their ways with one another and to their continuous surprise (in the
sense that what they turn out to want is not what they had thought they
wanted) – that “what they do together is less important than the fact that
they do whatever it is together.”56 Above all, they talk and acknowledge and
have fun with one another. To be sure, at least one of the pair in each case
has money, so that these couples are not in the end constrained by the pinch
of necessity (though often one of them has been thus constrained). They
do not have to get on with business. They have time for conversation and
exploration. This can make their careers seem like fairy tales or fantasies
for many of us.
But then the question that these movies raise and honorably answer is:
What – survival apart – is getting on with business for? Most of us, Cavell
argues, ﬁnd their answer to this, their achievement of a kind of ongoing
purposiveness (with one another) without settled purpose (no external aim,
room left for continuing exploration) to be something worth endorsing.
They achieve an “honorable . . . happiness”57 in and through their pursuits. “The pair is attractive, their wishes are human, their happiness would
make us happy. So it seems a criterion is being proposed for the success or
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happiness of a society, namely that it is happy to the extent that it provides
conditions that permit conversations of this character, or a moral equivalent
of them, between its citizens.”58 Since the criterion of happiness is satisﬁed
by these pairs, and hence proleptically for Americans as a people, the wages
of prophecy and conversion need not be only admonishment, rebuke, and
shame. Acknowledgment intertwined with fun is possible.
To be sure, even though it anticipates a more general happiness, the
happiness achieved by these pairs is achieved pairwise. The stateroom
door closes at the end of The Lady Eve, leaving Mugsy (and us) outside
the happiness of Jean and Charles; at the end of It Happened One Night,
the camera pulls away from the outside of the cabin as the lights go out
and the trumpet sounds, leaving Ellie and Peter inside their happiness, us
outside.
Partly, however, this division of the private, erotic happiness and intimacy of these pairs from larger social life is a function of the fact that
there is, unlike what Plato imagines the ideal city might accomplish, no one
ﬁnal achievement of happiness and freedom that is possible for us. Each
of us must begin from where we are, all at once within our tangled culture, from our individual talents and possibilities, and with certain speciﬁc
others, in engagement with the near, the low, and the familiar. This is an
American pursuit of happiness and freedom, not a Platonist59 pursuit of a
standing good. Both selves and language-culture are, always, on the way,
seeking always a further settlement. Improvisation, exploration, and wit are
not to be bypassed in this seeking in favor of submission to a ﬁnal theory. As Stephen Mulhall usefully comments, Emerson and Thoreau (and
Cavell) are committed to “writing in a way which acknowledges the relative
autonomy of both language and its individual speakers, their simultaneous
dependence upon and independence of each other.”60 Between self-speaker
and culture-language there will be interaction, always, including possibilities of departure and return.
Writing that acknowledges this condition, as the writing of Emerson and
Thoreau does, then “presents itself” not as the statement of a theory but as
“the realization of [Friedrich Schlegel’s] vision . . . of the union of poetry and
philosophy.”61 It will include narratives of departure and return, accounts
of rehearsals and efforts, and of partial (or pairwise) successes and failures.
The thoughts about our condition and possibilities that occur within such
writing will be provisional. They will aim, and will sometimes succeed partly
(but only partly), at offering us terms in which to do better from where we
are. Cavell captures this point by focusing on Emerson’s sentences from
“Self-Reliance”: “In every work of genius we recognize our own rejected
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thoughts. They come back to us with a certain alienated majesty.” As Cavell
goes on to comment, these sentences propose that
If the thoughts of a text such as Emerson’s (say the brief text on rejected
thoughts) are yours, then you do not need them. If its thoughts are not
yours, they will not do you good. The problem [ – or possibility? – ] is that
the text’s thoughts are neither exactly mine nor not mine. In their sublimity
as my rejected – say repressed – thoughts, they represent my further, next,
unattained but attainable self.62

To commit oneself, as Cavell does, to the cultivation of such repressed
thoughts (of America, of the self, and of their possibilities of freedom)
is to adopt what Simon Critchley has usefully characterized as a “weak
messianism,” wherein one engages in “ ‘a passive practice’, that is, a
way of inhabiting the actual everyday with one eye on the eventual
everyday.”63
Are the thoughts to which Cavell (after Emerson and Thoreau) proposes to return us our repressed ones? Is freedom – as acknowledgment,
and self-reliance, and mutuality, and achieved Power, and happiness in all
of this – central to the inner agenda of our selves and our American culture?
There are some reasons to be doubtful about this. Narratives of possible
conversion, however weak, do carry with them risks of authoritarianism,
hypocrisy, and the illegitimate repression of our natural and naturally divergent wants and desires. There is good reason, in order not to wallow
in guilt and shame, to accept ourselves as just wanting what we want and
just getting on with the business of life as best we can. If America promises
us no more than the chance to do that, as individuals, perhaps it is not so
bad: better this weak promise than the tribalisms and authoritarianisms of
Europe and its philosophies and religions. Why should I feel embarrassed
that I like, say, Robin Williams, and my wife, and my house, and you don’t?
Perhaps it is important to me, and should be to you, that these likings are
mine, not, or at least not necessarily, to be shared.64 Why should we not,
as pragmatism seems to suggest, just go absolutely with what works, from
where we are, without worrying about mysterious conversion to a higher
pursuit of freedom and happiness that might anyway make us too much like
one another?
But then – just as with Emerson and Thoreau – it is not clear that this
kind of worry is not already internal to Cavell’s own perfectionism and commitment to the pursuit of freedom. Perfectionism, as Cavell pursues it, “does
not seek to impose itself by power”; “the project of Emersonian Perfectionism demands no privileged share of liberty and of the basic goods.”65 To say
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this is to say that democratic equality and fairness and political liberty matter
and, further, that they matter speciﬁcally for the sake of the divergences,
explorations, and developments of individual interest and ability and commitment that they enable.
Cavell’s sense here – a sense shared with Emerson in his own continuing efforts to join in an American conversation of differing voices, without mastering it – is that there are certain “arguments that must not be
won”66 – among them the argument between the perfectionist, conversionand freedom-seeking voice in American life and the voice of the tolerant,
the divergent, the useful, the acceptance of ourselves as good enough as we
stand. “The conversation over how good [the] justice [of a good-enough
democracy] is must take place and must also not have a victor, . . . not
because agreement can or should always be reached, but because disagreement, and separateness of position, is to be allowed its satisfactions, reached
and expressed in particular ways.”67
What we seek, as individual selves, as friends and couples, and as
Americans, is “consent to our present state as something we desire, or
anyway desire more than we desire change.”68 Sometimes this will require
just acceptance: acceptance of liberal political arrangements, of divergences
within them, of the sheer difference of people other than oneself or of difference within oneself. Sometimes it will require conversion in the form of
openness to and commitment to a certain route of cultivation and expressiveness – sometimes for oneself, sometimes for several, sometimes for the
nation – in order to overcome present dissatisfactions. After all, “you never
know. I mean, you never know when someone will learn the posture, as for
themselves, that will make sense of a ﬁeld of movement, it may be writing,
or dancing, or passing a ball, or sitting at a keyboard, or free associating.”69
Cavell himself expresses some sense of being pulled between his particular
Jewishness and his more general Americaness, as they “inﬂect each other,”
suggesting that Thoreau and Emerson are of interest to him precisely because they keep open this mutual inﬂection of particular and national (in
him, and in the nation) by providing “a philosophy of immigrancy, of the
human as stranger”70 – seeking settlement, but never quite ﬁnally arriving
at it.
So you never know. I would not want the American settlement to
continue without furthering America’s and our sometimes repressed inner agenda of freedom – without continuing America’s romance – just as
I would not want that inner agenda to be administered in comprehensive (nonliberal) political enforcements that would always betray that very
agenda.71 You never know.
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Notes
1. This way of opening the subject is adapted from Russell Goodman,
“Cavell and American Philosophy,” archived at http://www.americanphilosophy.org/archives/2000%20conference%20papers/Goodman1.htm.
2. See Cornel West, The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragmatism (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989), for a reading
of a central evasion of epistemology in American philosophy, coupled oddly
with the thought that religiously inspired social prophecy is pursued nonetheless. Though West is right that both of these tendencies are in place in
American thought, there is more tension between them than he supposes,
as the evasion of foundationalist epistemology pushes toward the rejection
of social visions and in favor of utilitarianism, while the pursuit of social
prophecy seems to require an epistemology of larger visions in order to be
credible.
3. Though this is the standard picture in American departments of philosophy, it
bears noting that it is in many ways unfair to the richness and visionariness of
the actual writings of Peirce, James, and Dewey, among others. On James see,
for example, Charles Taylor, Varieties of Religion Today: William James Revisited
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002); on Dewey, see Goodman,
“Cavell and American Philosophy.”
4. Compare Jay Bernstein’s similar picture of professional philosophy in his essay
in this volume.
5. See Stanley Cavell, “Being Odd, Getting Even: Descartes, Emerson, Poe” in his
In Quest of the Ordinary: Lines of Skepticism and Romanticism (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1988).
6. See Richard Eldridge, Leading a Human Life: Wittgenstein, Intentionality, and Romanticism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), passim, for an elaboration of the relevant concept of expressive freedom, and especially also pp. 108–12
on Cavell in relation to this concept. The pursuit of expressiveness comes to
the fore in Cavell’s discussion of Thoreau in The Senses of Walden: An Expanded
Edition (San Francisco: North Point Press, 1981), pp. 55, 57.
7. For a reading of Cavell’s understanding of artistic modernism, as the pressure
toward it and the possibility of it are described by Wordsworth and by Kant,
see Timothy Gould, “The Audience of Originality: Kant and Wordsworth on
the Reception of Genius,” in Ted Cohen and Paul Guyer, eds., Essays in Kant’s
Aesthetics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 179–93.
8. Cavell, The Senses of Walden, p. 60.
9. Ibid., p. 71.
10. Stanley Cavell, A Pitch of Philosophy: Autobiographical Exercises (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 4.
11. Stanley Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), pp. 6–7,
emphasis and interjection added.
12. Ibid., p. 7.
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13. Cavell, Pursuits of Happiness: The Hollywood Comedy of Remarriage (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), pp. 4–5.
14. Ibid., p. 142.
15. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome, p. 7.
16. Cavell, “Being Odd, Getting Even,” p. 105.
17. Ibid.
18. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome, p. xxvi.
19. Ibid.
20. Cavell, Pursuits of Happiness, pp. 64–5.
21. Ibid., pp. 17–18.
22. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome, pp. 107, 28.
23. Stanley Cavell, The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and
Tragedy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 23.
24. Stephen Mulhall, Stanley Cavell: Philosophy’s Recounting of the Ordinary (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1994), p. 58. Interjection added.
25. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, p. 25.
26. Cavell, The Senses of Walden, p. 82.
27. Stanley Cavell, “The Avoidance of Love: A Reading of King Lear,” in his Must
We Mean What We Say? (New York: Charles Scribners’ Sons, 1969), p. 344.
28. Cavell, Pursuits of Happiness, p. 156.
29. Cavell, “Ending the Waiting Game: A Reading of Beckett’s Endgame,” in Must
We Mean What We Say?, p. 141.
30. Cavell, Pursuits of Happiness, p. 17.
31. Cavell, The Senses of Walden, p. 53.
32. Cavell, A Pitch of Philosophy, p. 142.
33. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. and ed. Paul Guyer and Allen
W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), B 131–2, p. 246.
34. Ibid., A 546–7 = B 574–5, p. 540.
35. Henry David Thoreau, Walden, Chapter 5, para. 11, “Solitude,” cited in Cavell,
The Senses of Walden, p. 102.
36. Cavell, The Senses of Walden, pp. 107–8.
37. Cavell, “Being Odd, Getting Even,” p. 106.
38. Cavell, The Senses of Walden, pp. 141–2.
39. Cavell, This New Yet Unapproachable America, p. 92.
40. Cavell, The Senses of Walden, p. 67.
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Cavell, Pursuits of Happiness, p. 10.
Cavell, “The Fantastic of Philosophy,” in In Quest of the Ordinary, p. 181.
Ted Cohen pressed me, rightly, to strengthen this point.
Cavell, This New Yet Unapproachable America, pp. 82–3.
Cavell, “The Philosopher in American Life,” p. 14.
Cavell, “Emerson, Coleridge, Kant,” in In Quest of the Ordinary, p. 35.
Again, a worry aptly urged on me by Ted Cohen.
Cavell, Pursuits of Happiness, p. 5.
Ibid., p. 130.
Ibid., p. 113.
Ibid., p. 65.
Ibid., p. 32.
I speciﬁcally note, however, that Plato’s texts, with their dramatic structures
of conversation, their allegories, and their frequent inconclusiveness are richer
and more “literary” than a Platonist doctrine of the good sometimes takes them
to be.
Mulhall, Stanley Cavell, p. 252.
Cavell, This New Yet Unapproachable America, p. 21.
Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome, p. 57.
Simon Critchley, Very Little . . . Almost Nothing: Death, Philosophy, Literature
(London: Routledge, 1997), p. 130.
For an eloquent expression of this thought, balanced against the contrary
thought that we also need to and can care about some things together, see
Ted Cohen, “High and Low Thinking about High and Low Art,” The Journal
of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 51 (Spring 1993), pp. 151–6.
Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome, p. xxii.
Cavell, A Pitch of Philosophy, p. 22.
Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome, pp. 24–5.
Cavell, The Claim of Reason, p. 465.
Cavell, “Being Odd, Getting Even,” in In Quest of the Ordinary, p. 115.
Cavell, A Pitch of Philosophy, p. xv.
Here, along with Russell Goodman, I have the sense that Cavell and Cavell’s
Emerson and Thoreau are perhaps less far from Dewey and James, and from
Rorty’s Dewey in Achieving Our Country, and from Cornel West’s “prophetic
pragmatism,” than is sometimes thought to be the case. Dewey and James and
Rorty and West, rightly read, do urge the perfectionist pursuit of freedom, in
and through continuing uncertainties, not just “coping.” Situating these ﬁgures
within the tradition of Emerson and Thoreau will mean, however, moderating
their voluntarism and utilitarianism and noticing how they remain haunted by
skepticism, even when and where they seek to deny this haunting.
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